HOW Do We Transform the United Nations and Global Governance: Learning to Market Global Reform.

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Summary: Most people analysing global governance recognize that in many domains the current system is not able to offer effective decision-making and action to deal with global challenges ranging from education and poverty to conflict and climate change. The world has a desperate need for global institutions capable of making workable decisions about the multiple problems plaguing the globe. They are all issues which cannot be resolved within the borders of one state. Globalization has made us one – more or less. Our international system has to develop global institutions that are able to debate and deliver workable solutions. This we know. But here the agreement ends. Some are afraid of expanded global governance. Some just do not think our current system of sovereign states will allow it to happen. Despite this, others are busy with plans to reform or to build new institutions. But, those who are crafting transformed institutions have all but forgotten one crucial question: how do we get the world to accept the proposed reforms? What are the impediments to moving toward an alternative global constitution and institutions? How do we start the thinking process? How do we build coalitions to initiate and nurture reforms? How do we set goals, mobilize actors, organize communications and education, and create strategies to make it happen? If our objective is getting the issue of how to create improved global institutions on the international agenda then we are going to have to learn how to sell our long shopping list of proposed reforms. We are going to have to market global governance. This paper considers the need for global innovation and the impediments to its attainment. It goes on to survey reform proposals before concentrating on analysing ‘how’ we should build a global transformation strategy.

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Biographical Note

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Specifying the need for reform of global institutions:

The world has a desperate need for global institutions capable of making workable decisions about the multitude of global problems that are plaguing the globe. These problems include regional conflicts, terrorism, weak states, drugs and mafias. Socio-economic problems include climate change, the wealth-poverty gap, pollution, mass migrations, financial crises, fundamentalism, the plight of women and children, and the threat of pandemics. Other problems related to the goals of development and human dignity including the Sustainable Development Goals: improving poverty, hunger, health, education, gender equality, water and sanitation, renewable energy, employment and economic growth, innovation and infrastructure, inequality, sustainable communities, responsible consumption, climate change, pollution of oceans and lands, peace and justice and working together.

This long list of global issues that affect the whole planet would take not one but a whole series of books to analyse. But there is one common denominator that allows us to go rapidly to the heart of the insidious weakness of global governance. It is the issue of the incapacity of the world to develop policies to adequately deal with the global challenges that go beyond capacities of any single state. Thomas Weiss recently put the issue of improved global governance on the agenda at the end of a recent publication. Does the global society in fact need some form of ‘world government’? For decades this term has been forbidden in ‘respectable’ discussions of international relations. Attempts have been made to replace some aspects of the term with the idea of ‘global governance’. But Weiss, one of the exponents of the use of ‘global governance’ has come to the conclusion: “We cannot continue to ignore and to rationalize the absence of overarching authority. Continued advances in global governance are desirable, feasible, and beneficial. But we are obliged to honestly ask … is adequate, let alone good, global governance imaginable without world government? No. It is time we opened our minds and consider all the ways that we might best govern the world… Humanity collectively is capable of better and more fairly governing the world (Beyond Platitudes, in Governing the World? Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 2014). The issue is, of course extraordinarily pertinent.

On the 18th of December 2015, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2254(2015) endorsing a “road map” for a peace process in Syria. It is a microcosm of the best and worst of the United Nations. It showed that the UN could still act for peace in the Middle East. It demonstrated the need for the effective diplomacy and for the UN as a world forum. The Resolution set a timetable for an urgent solution, called for a ceasefire, and demanded that the Syrian people should decide their future via free and fair elections.

Unfortunately, it was at least three years late. Already 4 million Syrians have been displaced, almost 300,000 innocent civilians have been killed, and the country bombed
into the ground. The Resolution was only adopted because it was backed by the five most powerful military states on earth – the United States, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom. Even so, Resolution 2254 does not deal with the ‘Terrorism’ of the Assad government nor specify what to do with him. Nor does it specify which ‘Syria’ will exist to hold elections, and what to do with refugees. The great powers are still struggling with the ‘Syrian problem’ and the Syrians are still dying.

Once again this situation demonstrates the need for the world to provide itself with institutions able to undertake detailed negotiation and diplomacy in complex situations and the legitimacy to carry out required programs of action in the world’s hot spots. As long ago as 1991, the Nordic UN Project linked development together with security because a stable global system is in the interest of all states. “Development assistance has a preventative role that is crucial to global security (81-2)" Today, we simply say ‘no justice, no peace.’ The people of Syria are the saddest example in the world today of the loss of development and dignity. Their needs may be for education, health and rights but their root problem is absolutism, conflict and the lack of peace, security and justice. The conflict is not just national but regional and pulls in global actors. Far from solving the problem the big powers are feeding it. So once again it comes back to a lack of global political will power and ineffective institutions. In this paper, I want to focus on the global common denominator – the need for reforms of international institutions. I ask three questions: First, in what ways has the world changed in the decades following the founding of the United Nations system that supports the call for institutional reform? Second, what is wrong with current efforts for reform? Third, how do we get all the practical and workable proposals for reform, which have been languishing in international tomes, actually placed on the international agenda? In other words, how do we teach ourselves to market global reform?

**What in the world has changed that requires improved institutions?**

The prior question that must be answered is whether we can say that the world has changed since 1945 to a degree which requires us to change the international institutions that were created at that time? Have changes had a demonstrable effect on diplomatic, military, economic, political and international humanitarian work. At what point do quantitative changes lead to qualitative consequences. Obviously this debate is too long for us here but we can list some indicators that suggest our world has indeed passed through a paradigm change.

- As regards emerging challenges, the most striking factor is that problems are now as much global as they are national or local. Major problems are without borders and cannot be resolved by any one country or group of countries. Of course, they start with climate change and related environmental issues like water levels, radical natural catastrophes, and pollution. But this is only the beginning. Then we have the recent rise
in local armed conflicts (42 in 2014 with 180,000 fatalities) and intensification of violence. Hence the requirement for the United Nations to have more than 100,000 peacekeepers. There are an increasing number of states (nine) with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction – with greater likelihood of errors and of such devices falling into the hands of terrorists. This is paralleled by trends in terrorism (3,329 deaths in 2000 rising to 32,685 in 2014), gangs, piracy and crime. Almost each year, we seem to see new threats of pandemics such as Ebola and now Zika mosquitoes. To this list of actual and potential horrors we must add recurrent financial crises, poverty, mass atrocities and human rights abuses. Then there are increased global migrations and surges of refugees and forcibly up-rooted persons which the UNHCR numbered at an all-time high of 46.7 million last year. Now there is talk of the potential for job wars and water wars. For instance, the world's 5 billion adults only have 1.5 billion full-time jobs to spread between them.

- Globalization has made us neighbours – a world society if you will. We are more connected than ever. The reasons are population, transport and communications. The world population stands at 7.4 billion and is growing at the rate of 21 million a year. No one can say what the globe’s carrying capacity is but, each year, we add more kindling to an already explosive situation. An explosion in transport of people and goods has made transportation hubs prime targets for terrorists. More and more people have first-hand experience in other countries. Rapid and complex communications provide us all with sources of knowledge and instant information about the world. These are no longer hidden in museums and libraries but are accessible to all. Porous borders and mass migrations add to the tensions. Social media spawn immediate feedback, precocious specialists with blogs and waves of opinion which overtake and inflate events. At one extreme, the result is the potential for ‘cyberwars’ and, at the other, the creation of networked societies. So, the global society is by no means a community. We now face extremes of inequality and concentrations of capital. Supposedly, one percent of the planet controls 50 percent of the wealth while more and more decisions are taken by the private financial markets rather than by politicians and the people.

- World institutions like the United Nations are accused (often falsely) of being incapable of resolving global challenges and yet at the same time they carry the world’s problems on their shoulders. Their scope is more and more relativized by other processes and actors. For instance, the remittances of foreign workers to their families in developing countries last year amounted to $50 billion while official development was barely $10 billion. International relations have been undergoing dramatic changes. We no longer live in a bipolar or unipolar world but one that is multipolar, with all that portends for instability. The former state-centric world of international relations completely dominated by state governments is now shared with other actors like intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs like Greenpeace and Amnesty), regional governmental agencies (such as the Arab League), multinational corporations, religious communities, and the ‘groups’ such as G-20 and G-78. At the same time the concept of ‘sovereignty’ is slowly being weakened, even as it is
contextualized. This multilateral world, in turn, is overlain with a dense set of bilateral treaty relations between the world’s nearly 200 states. Another contradiction is the fact that in many ways traditional diplomacy has declined and been replaced by hi-tech communications and the concentrated summitry of the leaders. To a great extent these leaders depend on a web of faceless bureaucrats and regulators barely known to the public – another factor in the centralization of wealth and power. One thing that has not changed is that states still refuse to accord the UN the resources it requires to carry out its coordinating functions.

• Even with all this complexification of the world scene, it is difficult to dogmatically state that we have arrived at a ‘tipping-point’ where remodelled international relations require a renaissance in world institutions. Nevertheless, the preponderance of facts and information do permit us to claim that we now need a paradigm change. To an ever-expanding degree, national problems that could be managed by state governments have gone beyond state boundaries and become global challenges requiring collective, multilateral management. Globalization has generated enormous degrees of integration and interdependence which is another way of saying mutual dependence. Thus, people should recognize that there has been a shift in international politics. Transformed institutions are needed if we are to deal with global challenges and a world society. It should be clear that this modified world requires careful management. It may require some form of world government.

The world is in desperate need of workable global institutions capable of taking decisions about the multitude of global problems that are plaguing it. As we have seen, each one of these global challenges has one common denominator: the present world is not set up to take authoritative decisions – decisions that will command respect and be adhered to – to deal with our global problems.

In June, 2015, the Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance was launched. In presenting their report, Co-Chair, former Nigerian Foreign Minister and UN Under-Secretary-General of Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari noted that “the UN and global governance institutions are ill-suited to address many modern evolving threats and must reform or risk prolonging and deepening global crises.” According to the co-chair, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the world requires “more capable tools of global governance, with different kinds of public, private, and mixed institutions designed for twenty-first-century challenges.”

Their report acknowledged that we need a longer term approach to global governance reforms with “a transitional strategy that includes building coalitions to initiate and nurture reforms … to martial, monitor and sustain support for the reform agenda.

But we should admit to ourselves that we have been talking about many of these topics for a good number of years now. To date, we appear to have more plans about what to
reform than we do realizations of change -- with a few noticeable exceptions like the founding of the International Criminal Court.

This lack of practical reforms was once again pointed out by Maggie Black, author of ‘International Development: Illusions and Realities’ in a recent article about the 15,000 word report for the 17 Sustainable Development Goal and their ‘dizzying’ 169 targets. She called it a “monument to mushiness and wishful thinking” and asked if statesmen and bureaucrats “live in an international fairyland”? She pointed out that “there is nothing in the agenda to say how to bring about this peaceful, just and sustainable developing world”.

Fortunately, we are beginning to think about the process of renewal

Fortunately, it seems the world is indeed starting to think about how to bring about change. In their books on transforming the United Nations system, Joseph Schwartzberg and John Trent stressed the issue of “how to get there” using civil society, education, strategic alliances and working on key changes (Schwartzberg 2013:319-337; Trent 2007: 217-260). For his part, to deal with “the international system that lacks central direction”, Thomas Weiss proposes a three-pronged strategy based on the use of technologies to improve accountability and negotiation; market incentives to expand cooperation; and revamping commitments to multilateralism (Weiss 2014: 93-101). More recently, the Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance (just referred to) devoted the final chapter of its Report to ‘A Transitional Strategy for Reform: “Getting from Here to There” which includes building “smart coalitions to mobilize support, a careful sequencing of reforms, a World Conference on Global Institutions, finding financial resources for reforms, and developing “a new kind of leadership” (Commission 2015:104-113). An international group of researchers has formed the World Government Research Network to promote the analysis of the concept of world government (www.wgresearch.org). On the world scene, as a follow-up to the establishment of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015, the UN set up the Sustainable Development Solutions Network to analyse indicators to serve as a model for the final package of performance benchmarks for implementation of the SDGs (Leadership Council 2015). Another major development came when 195 states signed the COP-21 Climate Change Conference agreement in Paris in Dec. 2015. But, now we have the hard part: groups such as 350.org, Future is Clean, and CDP.net believe it is all the more important at this point to make sure that governments live up to their (minimalist) pledges by demanding measurement, transparency, accountability and disclosure because the Paris agreement neither binds to targets nor prescribes action.

The process of conferencing that we are proposing is, in fact, part of the evolution of
international organizations. Evidence suggests that in international organizations, innovation often comes out of lively and continuous debate originating in scientific, technical and humanistic communities. Philosophical ideals play a leading role in inspiring pragmatic policies. Discussing intellectual, universalistic propositions forces people to take sides in the debates; debating in turn leads to organizations; informal exchanges transform themselves into official preparatory meetings; publicly made commitments tie the hands of those who make them (Reinalda 2001; Schemeil 2003:12, 17). Indeed, the conferencing process creates a temporary equality among unequals and encourages the sort of open discussion that often gives rise to innovation (Murphy 1994:62). Conferencing was also conducive for developing the techniques and the psychological aptitudes required for successful multilateral negotiation (Claude 1966:23). Engaged thinkers and practitioners found they could implement their ideas on a world scale. (Schemeil 2003:1). Private institutions and individuals experimented with institutions, debated ideas and reforms, and sometimes were called upon to prepare government positions. In other cases, NGOs learned that governments can be moved toward cooperation by private or unofficial pressures, skilfully applied (Lyon 1963:154). Changes in domestic politics contribute to windows of opportunity at the international level (Reinalda 2003: 9).

Immense challenges to global reforms remain

There is, however, an underside to the process of renewal of the global system. In the conclusion to his book, Governing the World, Mark Mazower delivers a withering critique of what many consider to be the most credible paths toward global reform. First, Mazower says people thought that the European Union was becoming a model society where the principles of social solidarity and human dignity could lead to a federation that would surmount inequality and poverty. Instead, the Union’s integration has been driven by a faceless bureaucracy which, with little accountability or transparency, has adopted neoliberalism and embraced global finance. A rule-bound liberalization of international capital opened up capital markets across the Union. Help for the regions failed to guarantee welfare for the poor and disadvantaged. The idea of a citizen’s Europe with strong representative institutions failed to materialize as the European Parliament was marginalized. “Europe empowers the regulators and the rule-makers over legislators” (p.412). Austerity has rolled back previous welfare achievements. Financial markets have an ability to preserve private profits while making society pay for their liabilities. The vision of an economy run in the service of human needs has been turned on its head. Mazower claims, “No longer the fount either of political liberty or of social welfare, European internationalism has moved a long way from its origins” (p.415).
Second, the European experience has shown that formal international institutions have played a minor role in the Union where networks of middle-level government officials, often mingling with regulators and industry experts, are the ones who get things done. Similarly, around the UN most of what goes on of real consequence is behind closed doors, humdrum and technical. Efficiency and expertise rule in a managerial world run by “networks of antitrust officials, police officials, prosecutors, financial regulators, intelligence operatives, militaries, judges and even, although lagging behind, legislators” (p. 416). In this deficit of democracy, Mazower maintains, experts are not always capable of standing above the political fray or not being called upon to represent their own government’s interests.

Third, there was the hope that civil society could inject some popular participation and outside expertise. However, criticisms abound. Western NGOs dominate, agendas are often established without public rationale or justification, they are relatively opaque, and their funding can become a form of cooptation. NGOs tend to be individualistic, hence having difficulty working together -- which is required for real influence. “They supplement but cannot substitute for the more holistic approach to the public that governing institutions are designed to adopt” (p.418).

Fourth, even less plausible as vehicles of democratic international life are huge charitable foundations and super-philanthropists like Bill Gates and Warren Buffett. They reflect the personal views and the preferences of the very wealthy including the application of business methods to social problems while ignoring the complexities of social and institutional constraints. They operate in places they know little about and create cartels of research that hinder real debate. They are even more unaccountable and opaque that NGOs. Mazower concludes, “Alone these philanthropists are inadequate vehicles to supply the public goods that well-run multilateral international institutions can deal with more systematically and openly” (p. 419- 420). While the West may have lost faith in the capacity of their governments, these governments do have built-in advantages such as long memories, accountability and experience in accommodating and mediating political conflicts within and between societies.

Fifth, the supposed advantages of the porous, fast-moving ‘networked world’ are dismissed by Mazower with the statement that they are rarely sources of durable political achievement.

Sixth, of most concern to Mazower, is the “collapsing importance of the public bodies that give national sovereignty meaning and the way that organs of international government and regulation have come to assail the internal legitimacy, capacity and cohesion of individual states. For him, if there are not effective states, there is no effective internationalism. But the state sovereignty about which he is concerned is
not that of Westphalian governmental impunity but that of popular democracy. He is worried about the hollowing out of representative institutions and curtailing their capacity to act. The erosion of sovereignty has been caused by a radical alteration in attitudes toward the state. The state that is meant to be the primary purveyor of public goods has been subordinated by politicians to the dictates of financial markets, private interests and lobbyists. The future has been privatized, monetized, and turned into a source of individual profit. This atomization of society has caused the distrust in politicians. They no longer seem to be able to mobilize a faith in our collective capacity to shape the future for the public good. Without models of equity, solidarity and sacrifice it is difficult to transform public attitudes toward governing institutions rooted in the collective values of a res publica. In this sense, “the idea of governing the world has become yesterday’s dream” (p. 427).

Of course, Mazower’s well-formulated critique stumbles over its own unrelenting negativism. He does not take into account many of the proposals for workable international reforms. Nor does he not take into account the fact that many of his criticisms of the various models of reform have already been answered. Nevertheless, his analysis is a worthy reminder of the immense challenges we face on the path to transformation of the global system.

A plethora of reform proposals

One challenge we do not have is any lack of reform proposals. We already have good and workable ideas about WHAT needs to be changed in the international system to make it becomes global in nature. Many reforms have been proposed from both within and outside the UN in recent decades. In their 1994 analysis on *Renewing the United Nations System*, Childers and Urquhart reminded us that in the first five decades of the UN there had been major reforms in the main Secretariat on an average of *every eight years!* Often, the most visionary proposals were simply postponed. Childers and Urquhart themselves stated, "We have proceeded from the premise that what will ultimately be needed -- major constitutional transformation of the disparate elements into an integrated United Nations – is not attainable now (p. 8)". I presented a synthetic overview of criticisms of the UN and reform proposals in my 2007 study on *Modernizing the UN System* (chapter 4).

Most reform proposals within the UN system have been aimed at specific administrative or financial modifications. But some cover the water front and are quite bold such as *A More Secure World* the report of the Secretary-General’s 2005 High Level Panel on Threats and Challenges and Change and the UN’s 1987 independent World Commission on Environment and Development’s report *Our Common Future*. But, most proposals for basic transformation of global institutions come from external

Pushing for more democratic global governance were two reports from the global south. The South Centre produced *For a Strong and Democratic United Nations: A South Perspective on UN Reform*. La Trobe University of Australia (along with Japan’s Toda Institute and Thailand’s Focus on Global South) published *Reimagining the Future: Toward Democratic Governance*. Both want the principle organs of the UN to be more globally representative. Two more radical sets of proposals from individuals were George Mombiot’s: *The Age of Consensus: a Manifesto for a new World Order* (2003) and Jacques Attali’s: *Demain, qui gouvernera le monde? (Tomorrow, Who Will Govern the World?)* (2011). Many others could be mentioned. Two of the most recent are Joseph Schwartzberg’s masterful and all-encompassing work: *Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World* (2013) and the equally broad report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance entitled: *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance* (2015).

Taken together, these reports show us, first, that the topic of the reform of international institutions has been debated for decades; second, that there is an established compendium of workable reform proposals, and, third that there is large agreement on the essentials of many of the most significant transformative ideas. All the following proposals have been on the drawing board for two to three decades. Everyone wants the Security Council to be more representative and transparent with the veto either eliminated or restrained. It is thought that some prominent non-permanent members could be immediately re-elected. Peacebuilding could be strengthened by a stronger Council. The agenda of the General Assembly needs to be focused and streamlined. The idea of weighted voting in UN organs has been present since at least 2001. The idea of a Parliamentary Assembly in a consultative status beside the General Assembly has been on the table since the early 1990s. It has recently been augmented with the less ambitious notion of a parliamentary network. These institutions need to be backed up by an international civil service based more on merit and less on nationality.

There is a desire for a Secretary-General with more authority and resources who has been selected (as has already started) by a more open and professional process. The weakest link in the UN is the ECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council. Current
proposals would bring it back to the role for which it was originally designed as the hub of international economic and social policy. It would now be expanded to include the environment and the global commons. More than ever, there is special emphasis on improved innovations in climate governance such as carbon monitoring, a research registry and an action clearinghouse to monitor national engagements. The new Economic, Social and Environmental Council would have to be improved by a more effective membership and an executive committee. It would centralize control over all financial and trade institutions and UN agencies and programs. A UN without an economic capacity simply cannot play the role that was expected of it in development and humanitarian affairs and the reduction of inequality.

As regards international law, citizens as well as states must be able to appeal to the International Court of Justice that will be empowered to make enforceable decisions that are globally applicable. It would also become the constitutional court for the UN system. It would have to be bolstered by a system of specialized tribunals (e.g. law of the sea, human rights etc.). There is a generalized desire for a more democratic United Nations where current organs are supplemented by a parliamentary network. Finally, it is broadly understood that the UN must be provided with its own financial resources and emergency peace services (including police and civilian specialists) for both of which there are a myriad of proposals that have been on the books for ages. Protection of human rights needs to be taken away from states and put in the hands of meritorious and representative individual specialists who would be backed up by tribunals and sanctions against perpetrators of egregious human rights abuses. Civil society, regional governments and business would gain greater representation and become partners of the UN system. Finally, in addition to these piecemeal reform proposals there are also a number of more broad-based suggestions for an entirely new global institutional architecture that would be closer to a system of world government.

The only problem with this very practical and doable wish-list is that there is presently no political will to make it happen. Fundamentally, state governments do not want to sacrifice any more of their sovereign authority to international organizations. They simply do not want to empower the United Nations. Secondly, public opinion is little aware of the global challenges and the necessary role of the public in demanding that their political representatives place reform high up on the global agenda. Finally, there is no mobilized and coordinated political movement to guide public opinion so it will encourage states to be more open to reform.
HOW are we going to bring about workable global institutions?

The current major problem is that we have not stopped to ask ourselves about the ‘how’ rather than the ‘what’ of global institutional reform. In other words, we work so hard defining ‘what’ needs to be changed, reformed or transformed that we forget to ask ourselves ‘how’ we are going to get into a ‘reform’ mode – how we are going to bring about new global institutions? Of course, this is not to suggest that research and analysis on specific reforms for the UN and for global institutions should not go on apace. But, beside the analysis of what to reform we also need to be making a specific effort to analyse how to get institutional reforms onto the international agenda -- what are the ‘Next Steps’ for moving toward a ‘workable world’. Getting into a reform mode is neither simple nor simplistic. Both Schwartzberg and I have pointed in the direction of public education and the need for civil society coalitions to lead the way. But, once we open the Pandora’s Box of ‘how’ to get institutional reform we see it is rather complex. The questions never stop coming. How do you improve public knowledge and awareness? How can we bring ‘progressive’, governments on side? What is meant by “new leadership”. Who will take the lead and what is the path of mobilization? Where does the money come from to finance a long-term campaign etc., etc.? What follows is an attempt to put these rather prosaic tasks in order so that we can put together a conference to think through a strategy for ‘how’ to transform the global landscape.

1) What are the blockages to global reforms and how do we surmount them?

What unifying concepts and sense of common cause will propel political change? Why can’t the UN make the big, urgent decisions? In other words, what are the major obstacles we must overcome if we want to launch new and improved global institutions? Surely the most formidable obstacle is the old concept of sovereignty – the belief that each state can do as it wants with impunity. The problems of international organizations flow from this outdated European concept. Worst of all, it is the major powers which should be leading the world, are hobbling the Security Council by threatening to use their vetoes to stop any basic reforms. Even so, we know that the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine which calls upon the global community to intervene to protect citizens from crimes against humanity is starting to gnaw into the concept of absolute sovereignty. Also, there are numerous efforts to curb the total veto of the P5 and to make sure new permanent members do not get the veto. Thus, our first question becomes: how do we get the P5 to restrain their powerful advantages.

The second blockage concerns the attitudes of states and peoples and short-sighted leaders about sovereignty and national interests. We just saw that the Security Council veto is founded on the bully principle that the most powerful – not the international community – should call the shots. But the rot of sovereignty and narrow national interests spreads much further throughout the UN. Regional caucuses of sovereign
states demand equal representation in all UN affairs, including human rights. The bureaucracy of the UN is still corrupted by hiring on the basis of national quotas. The root problem is, first, that countries still put their own ‘interests’ ahead of those of the world community and, second, national foreign policies are still elaborated by presidents and prime ministers acting like monarchs. There are few democratic controls. So our second question is: how do we get populations to challenge their politicians?

A third major structural blockage to institutional change are the UN professionals, past and present, who tell us, that the ‘pie in the sky’ dreams of fundamental reforms are neither necessary nor useful. The United Nations, according to these bureaucrats, is always in a process of reforming itself. For instance at present, the ‘UN hands’ point to a considerable number of studies, commissions, conferences and initiatives for global governance reforms which prove the UN is not at a stand-still. These are current examples of the truth of the old axiom that the UN is always reforming itself. However this ‘truth’ has limitations. The idea that the UN is self-adjusting has a stultifying impact on the capacity to re-think the United Nations. Also, in reality, few reforms are adopted.

A fourth blockage comes from the cosmopolitanists who should be the allies of structural reform. But, as international relations theorists they doubt that ‘real’ world national sovereignty can be overcome and they are also motivated by a fear of world government which they argue would be centralized and despotic. They propose alternate conceptions of a world beyond sovereign states, for instance based on a moral community of free and equal persons linked by cooperative associations and federations among peoples. After more than two centuries, they have barely gone beyond Emanuel Kant. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that principles and values are fundamental. Fears of creating an authoritarian global government must be displaced by the idea that any new institutions will include the techniques of democratic state-craft.

2. How do previous reforms, major study commissions and research on the UN teach us about innovation and how to learn and adapt in the building of institutions? Many of the people that managed previous reforms such as the founding of the International Criminal Court, the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines, the Montreal agreement on the Ozone Layer and the birth of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ are still around to educate us on what they learned on how to bring about major changes in the global system. We need to standardize these lessons. In addition, many previous studies by the UN and about the UN should be analysed for their wisdom on reform processes. We can think of such reports as those of the Nordic UN Project, the UNA-USA study, The Group of 18 Report, the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Kofi Annan’s report entitled In Larger Freedom, the Cardoso Report, Commission on Global Governance (Our Global Neighbourhood), International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and the World Commission on Environment and Development (Our Common Future). Then there are the studies of
such specialists as Urquhart and Childers, Maurice Bertrand, Danirl Deudney, Ernst Haas, Ted Luck, Maurice Strong, Robert Keohane, Elinor Ostrom, John Ruggie, Joseph Stiglitz, Andy Knight and Tom Weiss to mention but these few.

So we will want to study what has already been written about the reform of international organizations to mine these works for seminal ideas. Already we know from some of the above studies that successful reform efforts come about when a topic is ‘ripe’, that is, it has started to attract the attention of a growing number of members of the General Assembly. After that it needs the ‘push’ of an NGO movement that pressures friendly governments and the media which, in turn alerts public opinion and in general makes the issue ‘popular’. But we want to cast our net wider to englobe such fields as the sociology of institution building and the psychology and politics of change.

3. How do we instigate thinking about global governance reforms and the values, norms and principles that will underlie them? What new ethical vision? It will be unthinkable to conceptualize new global institutions without thinking about the values upon which they will be founded. We will need to develop research, analysis and workshops on the normative fundamentals required in the workable world order. This amounts to initiating a global constitutional debate. What might a new UN Charter for the 21st century look like? Should we seek a new set of “Globalist Papers” by leading world thinkers to open up the debates on the values and institutions required for a “workable world”? Certainly we will have to consider, among other subjects: evolving concepts of sovereignty, democracy, federalism and human rights; the meaning of security, development and authority at a world level; the purposes, objectives, principles of action, and membership rights and obligations for new world organizations, as well as their functions, powers and domains of action and responsibility, and of course rules of representation, voting methods and means of ratification etc. Constitutional and democratic safeguards will be crucial. These will include dividing and controlling power, promoting rights and equality, democratic institutions and processes, federalism, liberalism, rule of law, local police and militias.

4. How do we bring politicians and populations to agree to a more workable world and to lessen nationalist priorities? For instance, consider the following conundrums. In what order of priority should reform proposals be put forward? What is urgent and fundamental or, indeed, should what is fundamental be tackled after some minor successes have been achieved. Who are the most important audiences to target and in what order? For instance do we attempt to convince state leaders, first, or general public opinion? Which leaders are the most important: political, economic or social? Are there priority publics that should be targeted first? And how do we mobilize educational and communications talent and develop the most convincing arguments?
Obviously, it is not going to be easy. We will have to think deeply and widely. For instance, it seems the human brain is not well adapted to clearly perceiving the major threats by which they are faced. Daniel Gilbert, a professor of psychology at Harvard, says the kind of threats that we are evolved to deal with are those that are imminent rather than gradual – like being scared by a snake but ignoring the mega-threat of climate change. Yet our saving grace may be that humans are also endowed with the capacity to recognize their flaws and rectify their mistakes (N.Kristof, International New York Times: 25-3-16). So how do we go about getting people to think more long term and to recognize the major threats?

Perhaps we must show countries and peoples that dealing with the major challenges is in their own best interest and the national interest. Hans Morgenthau told us in his *Politics Among Nations* that we have to deal with the possibility that international cooperation may be a secondary and fortuitous phenomenon rather than the evolutionary endpoint of human affairs. We cannot rely on old dreams that the technocratic means for human development are at hand and that we can have faith in universal reason. Reality is a constant political struggle between good and evil. We have to take account of the basic human desire for power. Recent thinkers have proposed that our real task is to marry concepts of law, morality and power as we try to convince governments about the necessity of reforming the international system. We have to put ourselves in the place of politicians and editors to see their vision of the world and their objectives.

If we are to change popular knowledge and attitudes about something as distant as international relations, it is going to take the best we can come up with in techniques of education, communication, psychology, marketing, mobilization and organization. We will need the help and support of both analysts and practitioners, from specialists in such arts as the social media and computers. According to Mazower in his *Governing the World*, when the UN was been founded, they turned away from the Oxbridge classical dons who had spawned the League of Nations to include a new cohort of policymakers more comfortable with comparative legal systems, farm economics, the business cycle and the new social sciences. What are their modern equivalents?

5. **How can we strategize to move toward a better global system: small concrete functional steps in the fields states are prepared to accept or a major, mind-capturing thrusts toward global rationality?**

The founding and reform of international organizations has always been subject to the ‘evolutionary’ vs. the ‘big bang’ theories. Did the League and the UN result from carry-overs from previous institutions and periods or were they simply reactions to crises? In any case, do we have a choice right now? Are the global challenges such as climate
change, weapons of mass destruction and pandemics not so potentially destructive as to foreclose the possibility of ‘fiddling while Rome burns’?

Jean Monnet was the master of the art of small, functional steps in institution-building within Europe. His functionalist approach was based on building on areas where states were already attitudinally prepared to take steps in practical fields of application. Others like Altiero Spinelli thought the best approach is to build ambitions institutions and a popularly endorsed treaty, following a public constitutional debate about principles, norms and values. Are we already moving along the path of evolutionary change? Do the R2P changes to the all-important concept of sovereignty mean that we are no longer thinking about replacing states but rather extending their fields of action by encompassing new issues and actors while reducing areas of impunity?

6. How should we conceptualize the architecture of the future global system: One integrated organization or a “multilayered, minimal world authority”; One or more international organizations tied to networks of autonomous actors? How do we integrate new actors? Peace and security are only one of the elements of global governance but they are its sine qua non. Even in philosophy, ever since Immanuel Kant wrote Perpetual Peace in 1795, the goal has been peace but the fear of centralized domination has impeded thinking about possible world institutions. The effort to end war was the mandate of the United Nations. So far, it has helped to stop most international wars for sixty years, only to see local civil wars spill over into the international realm. Consequently, the UN has had to develop a wide-ranging peacebuilding capacity – encountering many notable difficulties. We must study the successes and failures of world organizations during this period to see how we can better insure peace and security.

Then there is the question of purposes and functions of new institutions and the paths for attaining them. How do we surmount the primary issues that have bedeviled the UN? If we assume that, in part, the G-7 and the G-20 were invented because the powerful states wanted to avoid the cacophony of the UN, we cannot avoid asking how to make global institutions efficient as well as representative? How do we attract back the rich and the powerful so we can deal with both economic and political functions? Also we must consider the executive, legislative, judicial and administrative functions of new institutions and the requisite powers and financial resources to carry them out. But, underlying these practical issues are even more fundamental discussions about how we define the sort of world management we envision. In part, the answer must be in transferring to the global level the best we have learned about national politics. As we have just seen, this means analysing how some of our most fundamental political concepts can be transferred to the global level. These would include democracy, decentralization, federalism, subsidiarity, checks and balances, human and minority
rights, liberty, representation and participation, accountability, transparency, distributive justice, government under law and limited power.

Thomas Weiss, in his book *Governing the World?* wondered if we are moving toward a “multilayered, minimal world authority based on the principles of federalism and subsidiarity with networks of actors having incentives to act productively in arenas where they have a comparative advantage” (p.98). However, he continues, the institutional fragmentation of such loosely knit networks could easily lead to “competition and turf battles, communications problems, redundancy and pathologies”. Still he believes dispersed authority is more viable than some new world Leviathan. We must make these decisions before “unspeakable tragedies” force them on us. He concludes that states will remain the fundamental building blocks for a system of governing the world; that workable intergovernmental organizations must include non-state actors; and that this will all have to be topped off by “overarching authority”. The goal may be relatively clear, but the path is still not.

7. **How do we choose and emphasize the most workable reform proposals to include in a ‘serialized approach’ to change?** In his book, *Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World*, Joseph Schwartzberg has already alluded to this issue. He believes several key reforms of the present UN could become catalysts for additional change. His preferences include an assessment system that would provide adequate funding; weighted voting (rather than one-nation-one-vote) in the main UN agencies to provide legitimized decision-making; a Security Council that is universally representative with weighted *regional* voting and no veto; the establishment of a robust, standing, all volunteer peace force under direct UN command; and incorporating expert civilian assistance for peacekeeping missions via the establishment of a UN Administrative Reserve Corps of volunteers with specialized professional competence. Such changes, Schwartzberg believes, would legitimize the UN as an autonomous collective body and provide impetus to further change.

But, a debate about the most propitious priority reforms remains before us. For instance, the Commission on Security, Justice and Global Governance has recently proposed reforms through parallel tracks to heighten awareness. At the outset, select UN representatives could deliberate on creating a UN Parliamentary Network to advise the General Assembly and a new UN Peacebuilding Council and a new framework for global economic cooperation. The Commission believes a careful sequencing of reforms based on criteria such as urgency, political feasibility and cost (also to be thought through) could speed reform along. But, it also cautions that such a path could limit chances for linkage between issues and also for deal-making and could open the process to subversion by powerful, single issue opponents.
8. How do we set goals and strategy to build coalitions to initiate and nurture reforms? How do we manage public education, popular communications and mobilization? We should take a lesson from the brilliant planning done for the original Millennium Development Goals. Success depends on setting concrete agendas, targets and indicators.

The Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance has suggested some practical steps for ‘Getting from Here to There’.

We have to bring together NGOs, former international practitioners, academics, former politicians and, potentially some governmental representatives and other informed and concerned global citizens to build on the knowledge and concepts we are developing. In my book on Modernizing the United Nations System I have already alluded to some of the requirements for mobilizing coalitions of NGOs.

To achieve this goal we should study case histories to see what we can learn from such campaigns as the creation of the International Criminal Court, the Landmines Treaty and the recent Paris Conference on Climate Change and the One for 7 Billion Campaign on the selection of the Secretary General. And then, what do we do about other potential participants like business, the arts and religion? But the major task is to mobilize world opinion and set in motion a process of reform of international organizations. This will require support from educators, psychologists and communicators. Possibly there will have to be a world movement of regional and ancillary meetings – along with virtual meetings on the Internet. We have to give world citizens an opportunity to have a voice concerning their future.

How do we recruit lead committees and supportive NGOs and other associations? We have to aim to combine both broad fields of competence and a small, finely-honed choice of participants, to marry the twin aims of representation and efficiency. Reform will not be easy. It will be opposed by those who have an interest in war rather than peace; those who feel secure within their narrow nationalism; and those who want to keep ‘the ignorant mob’ outside foreign policy decision-making.

Let us not neglect the all-important support of a small number of forward looking governments. Some might create specialized UN Reform programs in their ministry of Foreign Affairs and give it the resources required to carry out this monumental task. The basic objectives would be to carry out the research on the most propitious reforms and, secondly, the techniques for mobilizing support. These ministries would be seeking to advance global governance and encouraging ‘like-minded’ countries to become partners. It is only states which have the personnel and finances to move us toward more competent global institutions. Non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) can plan, push and prod to get the ball moving, but eventually some governments have to buy in.
At present, reforms to the UN and other global governance machinery are dealt with by governments on a piecemeal and usually narrow calculation of national interest. If UN reform-focused programs come into existence, they should not just focus on their own initiatives, but should serve as a link with other reform-minded countries and NGOs to build global momentum behind efforts to build a more workable global system for the 21st century. They could also serve within their government as an interdepartmental focal point for the growing number of global governance issues in commerce, the environment, resources, energy, water, transportation, health and security – to name but these.

**Conclusion:**

We have seen that there is a demonstrable need for new and improved global institutions and that there have been a whole series of workable reforms on the table for several decades. Why is it, then, that there has been so little buy-in to global reform? I want to put forward the hypothesis that the producers of reform proposals have never done very much to sell their products. Focusing on ‘how’ to get reform of the global system on the public agenda may seem mundane but it is necessary. To achieve change, we must develop an effective strategy. In fact, this is the way the world works. Business people spend a lot more time and money on marketing than they do on invention. Athletes work as hard on their game plans as they do on muscle building. Churches concentrate on building their flock more than on their doctrinal texts. Movie moguls make as much effort to attract the public as they do in deciding what films to produce. Everybody except those of us who work on UN reform seems to recognize that for real entrepreneurs marketing is the necessary hand-maiden of production. If we ignore this reality our reform proposals will continue to die on the bookshelf. We already have our ‘product’. For decades we have been making and refining international reforms. Now we must focus on ‘how’ to bring these proposals to the public’s attention.

So, if my hypothesis is correct, it is fair to ask why UN reformers do not make the effort to market their wares. I would suggest two reasons. Most reform proposals come from either individual scholars or small panels of UN specialists. In both cases, when their reports are written, they consider their work has been done. They do not make the effort to bring their ideas to the attention of decision-makers. This is certainly the case of scholars and analysts who work hard to create a publication, but then they hang up their spurs. There is also a certain conceit. There is an unwillingness to recognize the need to involve other specialists who might possibly know more about how to get the public and the politicians to buy into the need for change of global institutions. But we really do need the help of strategists, communicators, public relations consultants, educators, psychologists, mobilisers, marketers, sociologists and institutionalists. If we want reform, we really do need the help of these specialists. It has already been demonstrated that to date the only successful institutional changes were brought about,
first, by getting them on the UN agenda and secondly, by being supported by massive NGO coalitions. The Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court is a prime example.

Now that we have a defined problem and the beginnings of public interest in the issue of ‘how’ to create a more workable global system, it is time to focus our attention on developing a strategy for marketing global change. To this end, we must prepare one or more working conferences dedicated to the analysis of HOW we might best bring about reforms to the global political system. We can use the questions just outlined as a sort of agenda. Some might find this a rather pedestrian response to the issues that have been exposed. But, I would submit that there are limits to what NGOs and activists can do. We have already seen that specialists who have analysed the growth of the internationalist movement have shown the importance of ‘conferencing’ (a recent example is the note by Craig Murphy in Global Governance). Conferences bring people together, focus thought, and circulate new ideas. They allow people from government, business, the professions, academia and civil society to work for a common purpose. And they can put the spotlight on the need for a renaissance in our global institutions. In brief, conferences can get the ball moving.

The Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance mentioned above, concluded, “A World Conference on Global Institutions could serve as the meeting place for intelligent coalitions and also generate a political élan favorable to multiple and urgent world reforms.” Already, supporters of the Commission are planning for a conference in 2020. It is exactly where we should be heading. But first we must focus on a strategy for HOW to bring about renaissance of international institutions so that they become global in form and intent. I invite anyone who is interested to contact me.

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